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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/02/2011 Accident number: 594 
Accident time: 08:45 Accident Date: 04/05/2010 
Where it occurred: AF10809/09388/ MF 
0189, Sorkhdiwal 
village, Rodat district, 
Nangarhar province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 07/06/2010 
ID original source: Ref: 114 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/02/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons 
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
of the original formatting being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be 
revised as more information becomes available. 
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The cover letter and Lessons Learned summary are reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
Ref # 114 
File: OPS/14/09 
To: See Distribution List 
From: [Name removed], Chief of Operations, MACCA, Kabul 
Date: 07 June 2010 
Subject: Investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] DT 07 Demining 
Accident 
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of demining accident 
occurred on 04 May 2010 at 08.45 in sorkhdiwal village, rodat district of Nangarhar province. 
Best regards, 
Distribution List 
Complete investigation Report to: [Demining group] 
Lessons Learned to: [All demining agencies active in Afghanistan at the time.] 
MDC, RONCO, HT, MCPA, DDG, ATC, JMAS, PM/WRA, HDI, DAFA, G4S, EODT, ACL, 
CMCC, MTI, NDSS, PSS, UXB, AMACs (7). 
For Information: 
MACCA, Chief of Staff DMC, Director 
Operations Staff 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 07 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC East to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner DT-07 of [Demining group]. The accident occurred at 
08:45 hours on 04 May 2010 at minefield number AF108091093881 ME 0189, located in 
Sorkhdiwal village, Rodat district of Nangarhar Province. 
SUMMARY: 
AF10809/09388/ MF 0189 located about 25km to the east of the Jalalabad City. This area is 
contaminated with anti-personnel mines by Russian troops in 1984. Because of its strategic 
location, this area was used as security belt around Jalalabad city and nearby military areas 
and positions. 
[Demining group] DT-07 was tasked to start clearance operation on 01 April 2010. Size of the 
area is 83912sqm. During the clearance operations, 22194sqm area cleared and one AP 
mine was found/ destroyed by team before the accident happens. 
On 04 May 2010 at 08:45 am while [the Victim] the de-miner was excavating a detected 
signal in his clearance lane, his bayonet hit top of an anti-personnel PMN mine and caused it 
to go off. According to the investigation report, it seems that the de-miner started excavation 
directly from the pinpointed spot with his bayonet and caused the explosion and accident. 
Unfortunately improper use of PPE caused catastrophic injuries to the face and eyes of the 
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victim deminer. He has lost his right eye, traumatic amputation of right-hand fingers and 
sustained some superficial injures on different parts of his body. The command group of 
mentioned team failed to control the deminer during the operations and let him work without 
visor and in a careless manner. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Lack of proper supervision and poor command and control is identified as main contributing 
factor, as the deminer was not stopped while he was working without proper use of PPE/visor. 
The deminer himself was in a good health condition before the accident, and had not been 
suffered from any serious issue to affect his performance, so the next contributing factor for 
this accident is carelessness of deminer. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
However corrective actions have been taken by [Demining group] after the internal 
investigation, but the following points are to be considered and distributed to the team level by 
all demining organizations: 
1. Full PPE and visors shall be worn appropriately during the period of demining operations in 
the field. 
2. The poor performance of command group should be taken into account seriously and 
appropriate actions to be taken by operations management team. 
3. Strong internal QA system can guarantee the improvement in operations and reduce the 
risk of unintended detonation and severe consequence of accidents, so more attention should 
be paid to internal QA system. 
4. [Demining group] management should provide MACCA Operations department with a 
written feedback on all aspects of corrective/preventive actions taken within 7 days, effective 
to the issue date of this letter. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 778 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Body, severe Face, severe Hand 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye, Fingers  





The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field control inadequacy because the Victim 
was working without a visor and his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as 
Inadequate equipment because the deminer was working with an inappropriate hand-tool that 
does not meet the recommendations of IMAS 10.30 and severe hand injury resulted. This is 
also a Management Control inadequacy at all levels, because the tool used had been 
approved by the UN supported MACCA. The “Inadequate equipment” listed under notes 
refers top the issue of an inappropriate tool, the unsafe AK bayonet. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
This is in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS which they are required to apply. The 
summary of the accident is good, and its presence implies that a full and comprehensive 
accident investigation was made, but not made available for others to learn from. 
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